CVE-2026-81098

The Telnyx MCP server exposed its HTTP transport on every interface and did not require a caller credential. packages/mcp-server/src/http.ts served MCP on the root path with a listener bound to all interfaces and parsed the caller's authentication headers in a mode that did not fail when they were absent, so a request without any credential completed initialisation and dispatched tools. Dispatch forwarded the server's own stored credentials, the Telnyx API key and client secret together with the code-execution key, to the upstream endpoint, so an unauthenticated caller able to reach the port acted with them. The current code defaults the host to loopback, requires a server API key, and enforces it in middleware.

Referanslar

• https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-node
• https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-node/pull/450
• https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-node/security/advisories/GHSA-46jp-xr2h-fw7h
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/telnyx-mcp-server-through-6.83.0-missing-authentication-on-streamable-http-transport