CVE-2026-118988

CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route. Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC. Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file.

Referanslar

• https://github.com/oetiker/callbackery/commit/128efe804fde41bba9633fe00dc94e30f12087fb.patch
• https://metacpan.org/release/OETIKER/CallBackery-0.60.1/source/CHANGES
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/30/11